Reimbursement of Corporate Directors and Officers for Successful Defense of a Shareholder's Derivative Action by Dillon, Cornelius W.
Reimbursement of Corporate Directors and
Officers for Successful Defense of a
Shareholder's Derivative Action
Corporations are guided by boards of directors. These direc-
tors may also be officers. Most directors and officers are chosen
because they meet the high qualifications required of men who
are to direct and plan the future of the corporate business. Some
are chosen because their names add prestige to the corporation
or enable the corporation to more easily obtain credit. Often, a
director receives only nominal compensation for his services as
a director, although he usually gets enough to cover the expenses
of attending a directors' meeting.'
A shareholder in the corporation may suspect or believe that
the director has injured the corporation by some dereliction of
duty whether through fraud, negligence, abuse of discretion or
similar wrong. He may then proceed to institute suit against the
derelict director on behalf of the corporation. The shareholder
may be sincere in bringing his suit, or on the other hand, he may
be a disgruntled minority shareholder interested only in harassing
the corporation. In more extreme cases he may be interested only
in filing his suit in the hope of making a private settlement for
whatever he can get.
The director now finds himself in the position of having to
defend himself against the shareholder's suit. "In many cases the
damages alleged run into hundreds of thousands of dollars.2 The
director may be a man of wealth or he may be of modest means,
as is usually the case in most corporations. Nevertheless, he is
compelled, at no small cost, to engage counsel for his defense
whether the suit is genuine, for harassment or in the hope of a
private settlement. In the latter tvo cases the suit is almost al-
ways groundless.
Let us assume that the suit is genuine and that the share-
holder has obtained a judgment against the director. Under the
theory of derivative suits, the shareholder is acting in behalf of
the corporation and anything he recovers inures to the benefit of
1 $285. per year is an estimate of what the average director receives. N. Y.
Times, Dec. 10, 1939, Section 3, p. 1, col. 8, quoting National Industrial Con-
ference Board findings. If the director is also an officer, his compensation will
be considerably higher. Assuming that today the amount is twice as much,
the compensation is still negligible.
2 As to the size of recovery and its percent of the amount sought in New
York derivative actions see, Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders'
Derivative Suits (1944), p. 79 et seq.
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the corporation.3 The shareholder now claims reimbursement from
the corporation for his expenses, including attorneys' fees, and
the courts almost invariably grant it. This is on the theory that
the litigating shareholder represents all the shareholders as agent
and that since the corporation is benefited, it would be unjustly en-
riched if it did not bear the cost of the benefit.4 Both the repre-
sentative and the benefit factors must be present. If the share-
holder is unsuccessful, there is no benefit to the corporation and
he cannot recover his expenses.5
Conversely, what about the director? Can he collect anything
from the corporation for his expenses incurred in defending the
suit even though he has lost? The courts have generally denied
reimbursement for litigation expenses when the director has been
unsuccessful. 6 This result seems to be based on the premise that
corporate funds must be used for corporate purposes. When the
stockholder has been successful, he is the party that has served
a corporate purpose and can be reimbursed. The director, how-
ever, has served no corporate purpose and, in being found derelict,
has in fact, acted adversely to the corporation.7
However, a director is not to be completely denied when un-
successful. If corporate interests are sufficiently threatened, courts
will charge the corporation with the expenses incurred in connec-
3 Horton v. Johnston, 166 Ala. 317, 51 So. 992 (1910); Anderson v. Derrick,
26 P. 2d 463 (Cal. 1933), Aff'd on rehearing, 220 Cal. 770, 32 P. 2d 1078 (1934);
Roscower v. Bizzell, 199 N.C. 656, 155 S.E. 558 (1930).
4 Lamar v. Hall, 129 Fed. 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1904); Hand v. Savannah &
Charleston R. 1., 21 S.C. 162, 178-179 (1884); Buell v. Kanawha Lumber Corp.,
201 Fed. 762, 767-769 (E.D.S.C. 1912). It is socially necessary that the share-
holder be enabled to recover, otherwise the effect would be that he would
be unable to police the corporate management because his recovery would
seldom exceed his costs. Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity 50 HaRv.
L. REV. 171, 190-191 (1936). Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct 47 Hav.
L. REv. 1305, 1307, 1329-1334 (1934).
5 In some cases, even though the shareholder brought the suit to a success-
ful conclusion, the fact that there was no pecuniary benefit to the corporation
may still prevent his recovery of expenses. McArthur v. John McArthur Co.,
39 Cal. App. 704, 179 Pac. 700 (1919); Hildreth v. Western Realty Co., 62 N.D.
233, 242 N.W. 679 (1932).
6 Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 575 (1942); Wicker-
sham v. Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 Pac. 603 (1895); see Washington, Litigation
Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stockholders Suits, 40 COL. L. REv. 431,
433, n. 7 (1940).
7 See Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, Cf. Solemine v.
Hollander, 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. 2d 344 (1941).
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tion with such defense.8 But directors are not reimbursed, wheth-
er successful or unsuccessful, if the subject matter of the suit
involves non-corporate matters, such as a criminal action against
the director for improperly making tax returns.9 Likewise, reim-
bursement has been denied when the director has been charged
with misfeasance in office and the suit discontinued without formal
exoneration of the director.10 In these areas the judge-made law
is fairly well settled. The real problem before the corporation and
the courts today concerns the reimbursement of the director when
he has successfully defended the suit and has been completely
absolved of any dereliction in duty. Should he be reimbursed
for the expenses of litigation?
There are only a few cases that have dealt with this phase
of the problem. However, their analyses of the problem indicate
that there is anything but certainty as to just what the proper
view should be. Some cases hold that unless the successful defense
results in a benefit to the corporation, the director cannot be re-
imbursed for his expenses incurred during the litigation." A few
hold that policy and the duty of the principal to indemnify his
employee or agent for expenses arising from the proper perform-
ance of the duties of his employment dictate that he be reimbursed
notwithstanding a lack of benefit to the corporation.' 2 The former
view, however, represents the weight of authority of those few
cases which do permit reimbursement. However, many corpora-
tions and some states are not sympathetic with this view of the
courts. As a result, they have attempted to obviate its effect by
the use of corporate agreements and statutory provisions. These
make it possible for the director, who successfully defends, to
claim reimbursement from the corporation whether or not there
is a benefit upon the corporation. Questions immediately arise.
Which view is more constructive and harmonious with contem-
8 Albrecht Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N. Y. S.
2d 415 (1939), Affd', 280 N. Y. 840, 21 N.E. 2d 887 (1939); Esposito v. Riverside
Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, 191 N.E. 363 (1934) (receivership); Godley
v. Crandall & G. Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N. Y. Supp. 251 (1917), affirmed
without opinion in 227 N. Y. 656, 126 N.E. 908 (1920) (receivership).
9 Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 Fed. 583 (W. D. Pa. 1923) (successful
directors); Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276
(1922).
10 Wood v. Noma Electric Corp., 96 N.Y. L. J. 1121, Col. 7 (1936) (officially
unreported).
11 Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, (D.C. 1940); Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App.
553 (1931). For a more complete list, see 152 A. L. R. 924.
12 Solemine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A. 2d 344 (1941), 26 Mnsx.
L. REv. 119 (1941); Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581, 110 N.W.
798.
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porary society? Is it proper that a director or officer should be
indemnified when it is established that he has not betrayed his
post?
PROPRIETY OF REIMBURSING =H SUCCESSFUL DIRECTOR
We commence with the basic proposition that a corporation
is operated for profit. Therefore, gifts of the corporate assets
should not be allowed.13 This is one of the favorite arguments of
those who condemn indemnity to the director. They say that the
reimbursement is an outright gift of the shareholders' money and
should not be permitted. But to dogmatically label these payments
as gifts ignores entirely the view that reimbursement could, and
should, be considered as a legitimate business expense of the cor-
poration. The axiom that corporate expenses must be made in
furtherance of the corporate business has been expanded in the
modern cases.14 There are cases upholding the power of the cor-
poration to spend money for improving the health of its employ-
ees,15 for supplying them with adequate housing,'6 and for furnish-
ing housing facilities in the town in which the corporation oper-
ates.' 7 Still others permit expenditures for inducing prospective
employees to accept employment, for entertainment, for payment
of moving and traveling expenses. One case went so far as to
hold the corporation liable on its guarantee of an obligation of
a salesman incurred in the purchase of furniture for his home.' 8
The justification for such payments is clearly that the corporation,
in order to acquire and retain the benefit of the services of quali-
fied employees, may incur the expenses in question.19 Can it be
denied that the acquisition of qualified directors is not a benefit
to the corporation? It is submitted that the reimbursement of the
director who successfully defends a shareholders' derivative suit
can be properly considered as an expense of the corporation. From
another viewpoint, social policy dictates that highly qualified men
direct our corporations. This is especially so when economic power
is highly concentrated in the directors of a few of the large cor-
porations of today. When these directors make decisions, it often
has a greater effect upon our domestic and foreign affairs than
13 Brinkerhoff Zinc Co. v. Boyd, 192 Mo. 597, 91 S.W. 523 (1906).
14 40 COL. L. RIV. 1199 (1940), citing Note 31 CoL. L. REv. 136 (1931).
Is People eX Tel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150,
120 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1909).
16 Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1896).
17 Cf. Coming Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F. 2d 798 (D. C. Cir. 1929); 40
COL. L. REv. 1192, 1199 (1940).
Is Burg v. Twin City Four Wheel Drive Co., 170 Minn. 101, 103, 167 N.W.
300 (1918).
19 40 COL. L. Rv. 1192, 1200 (1940).
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many of the decisions of our high government officials. And these
directors are not responsive to the people. This is all the more
reason why the public should at least be assured the best men
possible.
There are many other equally cogent reasons for reimbursing
the director who successfully defends a derivative suit. Indemnity
to a successful director would perhaps discourage actions of the
strike variety. The existence of a policy of indemnifying a suc-
cessful director would encourage directors to press for trial those
actions in which they were reasonably confident of prevailing,
since success would vindicate them morally, as well as free them
from the burden of the litigation expense.2 0 The increased hazard
to the director brought about by profuse administrative regula-
tions is still another reason. An example is the Securities Ex-
change Act, Sec. 11. Under this provision the director may be
sued and held liable for mere negligence. It seems that it would
be just as easy to justify reimbursement to a director when he is
not at fault as it is to uphold indemnity under Workmen's Com-
pensation laws where the laborer is quite often found to be at
fault. The risk can easily be placed on the business.
21
Arguments have been advanced in opposition to the payment
by the corporation of the successful directors' expenses. But gen-
erally they are quite shallow and can easily be disposed of. A
strong contention is that if the corporation pays when the share-
holder wins and also if the director is successful, then every time
there is a derivative suit, the corporation is certain to have to
pay. The claim is that this will be an undue burden on the share-
holders' capital tending toward the ruination of the corporation.
But it must be remembered that when the shareholder is success-
ful the corporation usually benefits pecuniarily. On the other
hand, when the director is successful the costs should be consid-
ered as a legitimate expense. Furthermore, although there are
many derivative suits the number against any one corporation is
not too great.
Then, an attempt is made to compare the director with other
fiduciaries. It is often held that the agent cannot look to the prin-
cipal for his litigation expenses when he is sued by the principal
himself, even if the agent wins the suit.22 And again, officers of
20 Id at 1205.
21Wood, in his survey, suggests that the cost of the successful directors'
attorneys, etc., should be placed on the unsuccessful shareholder bringing the
suit. WooD, SuRvEy AM REPORT REGARDinG SHAsmosmms' DERIVATIV SUITs 20.
This disregards the policy favoring derivative actions in that the shareholder
would have more to lose than he could hope to gain.
22 Cory Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. United States, 51 F. 2d 1010, 1013 (2d Cir. 1931).
Accord: Buckley v. City of New York, 170 Misc. 412, 415, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 650
(1939).
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municipal corporations are usually not allowed to be reimbursed
for successful defense of a suit relating to the performance of
their official duties.23 But what about trustees and receivers? The
trustee is entitled to charge the estate with the expense of repel-
ling an attempt to subject him to a surcharge, or a proceeding
for his removal, brought by a beneficiary. The same holds true
for the receiver.2 4 No definite rule is consistently applied where
an executor or administrator is involved, although the tendency
has been to permit an allowance for attorneys' fees incurred in
making a successful defense of their conduct or position.2 5 The
answer to this argument is that possibly good policy demands
that all these fiduciaries be indemnified when they are successful.
But in the final analysis the answer is that the director's position
is sui generis. Of all the fiduciaries, his post is the most hazard-
ous and usually the least rewarded. He is accountable to a con-
stantly shifting group; each day there may be new stockholders
entitled under the law to call him to account, perhaps including
some who have acquired their share with the sole purpose of bring-
ing him to the bar of justice.2 6
It is submitted that these circumstances require that the direc-
tor be treated differently. When he successfully defends a share-
holders' derivative suit, indemnity, in good conscience, should not
be denied.
Granting that a director should be reimbursed, how should
it be provided for and by whom?
REimUm-sEmmr BY CORPORATE AGREEMENT
In order to avoid the judicial denial of relief to a director
who has successfully defended, many corporations have attempted
to guarantee their directors this protection by agreements. These
agreements, in effect, say that the corporation will save the direc-
tor from any expenses in connection with successful defense of a
derivative action. The use of the agreement, however, is not free
from its accompanying problems. The first problem to be raised
is that of the validity of this type of agreement. It is commonly
challenged on the ground that the act is ultra vires if the corpora-
2 3 Chapman v. New York, 168 N. Y. 80, 61 N.E. 108 (1901). And See 5
McQu3mn, MumciPiL CoRomA iNs § 2327 (2d ed. 1928); 6 McQum=,
Mumci.AL Co~pommoNs §§ 2532 and 2583 (rev. ed. 1937). The requirement
that public funds be used for a public purpose is the usual basis.
24 2 ScoTT, TausTs § 188.4 (1939); Jessup v. Smith, 223 N.Y. 203, 19 N. E.
403 (1918). Missouri & K. L Ry. Co. v. Edson, 224 Fed. 79 (8th Cir. 1915)
(receiver).
25 See 3 WoEmm , Am . LAw OF AmINSTrATION, § 515, ff. (3d ed. 1923);
90 A. L. R. 101 (1934); 101 A.L.R. 806 (1936).
2640 COL. L. REv. 431, 448 (1940), and cases cited.
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tion is not a professional surety. But if we carry through the idea
that these payments are expenses of the business then there is
less reason to deny this being an incidental part of the business.
Nevertheless, there is some doubt that courts will accept these
payments as expenses of the business or that they will not deem
them ultra vires acts.
Then too, there is some uncertainty surrounding these agree-
ments relevant to their violation of public policy. The claim is
often made that such agreements tend to induce the directors to
act negligently or recklessly when they know that they can be
reimbursed. But the agreements contended for, however, would
reimburse the director only when he is successful. If he were sure
of indemnity when he was wrong, this argument would have some
force. These are substantive considerations. There are even more
problems from the procedural standpoint. How and by whom is
the corporate action to be taken? Should it be by action of the
board, by by-law amendment, charter amendment, or by share-
holder action?
If we permit the board of directors to take action on the
matter and vote the reimbursement to directors we face the prob-
lem of the directors dealing with themselves. It is a general rule
of law that corporate directors are precluded from increasing or
voting compensation to themselves as directors or officers for
either past or future services.27 But all kinds of uncertainties
arise when you try to speculate as to whether or not a court will
consider reimbursement compensation. Likewise, it is not clear-
cut as to how the courts will react to the matter of disinterested-
ness required of voting directors when all the directors had been
successful parties defendant to the same action.
Authorizing the payment by by-law amendment or by charter
amendment is about as clouded with doubt and uncertainty as is
payment authorized by the directors. It is usually much easier
to amend the by-laws than the charter. True, in both cases it
must be submitted to the shareholders. But often it is more diffi-
cult to secure amendment to the charter than to by-laws because
the shareholders usually use more caution in connection with the
basic charter instrument. Most corporations that have heretofore
authorized these agreements have done so through the by-law.2S
27 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, Care & Boyce, Inc., 124 Misc. 480, 209 N. Y.
Supp. 258 (1925), Affd without opinion, 216 App. Div. 787, 214 N. Y. Supp.
815 (1926) ; 40 COL. L. Ruv. 1192, 1201 (1940).
28 Notes 10, 28 & 29, 40 COL. L. Ruv. 1192 (1940). The following is a typical
example of a by-law amendment:
"In addition to reimbursement for his reasonable expenses incurred in
attending meetings or otherwise in connection with his attention to the affairs
[Vol. 1!2
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At this juncture it might be well to mention that most voting on
these proposals is done by proxies which have been solicited by
the corporation management. It might be well to weigh this factor
in connection with the over-all consideration of using corporate
agreements as a means for reimbursement.
Assuming that the by-law procedure will be used most often,
are there any disadvantages in its use? One strong defect, and it
is one that is common to any corporate attempt at reimbursement,
is that when each corporation is left to its own desire, there is
too much chance that their acts will be hasty and shaped by con-
siderations not in the proper interest. Difficulty might also arise
with regard to directors who are also shareholders. Can they vote
in a shareholders' meeting upon a proposal to reimburse them-
selves? Although most of the courts have recognized that the
director upon entering the shareholders' meetings has a freedom
of action divorced of any fiduciary relation,29 still there is an
element of chance that a court might see otherwise. All of this
weighs against the by-law method of reimbursement and in favor
of a method more certain.
Finally, should the reimbursement be made through a vote
of the shareholders? This procedure, it will be observed, has
serious disadvantages. Such a method would be very expensive
if a meeting had to be called each time. But an even more potent
objection is that an inconsistent policy might well result; indem-
nity being granted in some cases, while denied in others, although
the directors are equally deserving in each case.
In the event any one of the above procedures is utilized, there
are still other difficulties and uncertainties that beset the use of
the corporate agreement method of reimbursing the director. The
of the corporation, each Director as such, and as a member of any committee
of the board, shall be entitled to receive such remuneration as may be fixed
from time to time by the Board of Directors; provided, however, that the
aggregate of such remuneration of any director as a director and as a member
of any committee of the Board, shall not exceed during any one calendar year
the sum of $5,000. Each Director and officer shall also be indemnified by the
corporation against expenses reasonably incurred by him in connection with
any action, suit, or proceeding to which he may be made a party by reason
of his being or having been a Director or officer of the corporation, except
in relation to matters as to which he shall be finally adjudged in such action,
suit, or proceeding to have been derelict in the performance of his duty as
such Director or officer; and the foregoing right of indemnification shall not
be exclusive of other rights to which he may be entitled as a matter of law."
Proxy statement of Johns-Manville corporation dated March 2, 1940.
29 Gambel v. Queens County Water Co. 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890);
Thurmond v. Paragon Colliery Co., 82 W. Va. 49, 95 S.E. 816 (1918); Latten,
The Minority Stockholder and Intra-Corporate Conflict 17 Iow.A L. REV. 313,
331-2 (1934).
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actual drafting of the agreement must be done with care. There
must be excluded from its scope any pending litigation, to the
extent of that portion of the litigation expenses incurred prior to
the adoption of the by-law. To include these pre-existing charges
would invite an attack based upon the principle that the directors'
past services having been compensated, the attempt to pay addi-
tional compensation would be a prohibited gift.30 If courts would
hold that these payments are expenses and not compensation, then
the result might be different.
Also to be considered in drawing up the agreement is the
amount of reimbursement and for what items. A standard of rea-
sonable expenses is often used in corporate agreements. This is a
fair standard because it preserves the element of discretion that
is needed in some cases with respect to this factor. But one can
easily see that if the items and amount are left to each corpora-
tion, an infinite number of variations are possible depending on
the views of the particular corporation.
These are but a few of the difficulties that can be encountered
if this problem is to be solved through the efforts of the individual
corporations. Difficulties and uncertainties such as these have led
the General Counsel's office of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion to question the validity of these agreements.3 1 The commission
supervises the issuance of proxies by corporations having securi-
ties listed on a national securities exchange. In spite of its doubt
as to legality, the commission has permitted the inclusion of these
agreements in proxy statements if they follow a certain form.3 2
In Ohio, corporate agreements are used by corporations. Each
corporation prepares its agreements as it sees fit and consequently
there are many different types. There are no Ohio cases touching
upon the validity of these corporate agreements. The only Ohio
case dealing with this problem of reimbursement held that there
must be a benefit upon the corporation or that the payment must
30 40 COL. L. REV. 1192, 1203 (1940); Cf. Young v. U. S. Mortgage & Trust
Co., 214 N. Y. 279, 108 N.E. 418 (1915).
31 40 COL. L. REV. 1192, 1206 (1940).
32 General Counsel's office has interposed no objection to the following:
"Each director and officer (and his heirs, executors and administrators) shall
be indemnified by the corporation against reasonable expenses incurred by
him in connection with any action, suit or proceeding to which he may be
made a party by reason of his being or having been a director or officer of
the corporation, except in relation to matters as to which he shall finally be
adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to have been derelict in the per-
formance of his duty as such director or officer; and the foregoing right of
indemnification shall not be exclusive of other rights to which he may be
entitled as a matter of law." The S. E. C. and Directors' Indemnity: Recent
Developments, 40 COL. L. REv. 1206, 1207 (1940).
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be authorized by the shareholders. 33 This seems to be broad enough
to cover corporate agreements. However, it is too sweeping to ef-
fect a standard policy. The foregoing analysis now forces the con-
clusion that if we permit each corporation to provide for reimburs-
ing its directors by agreement, the results will be unfavorable. As-
suming that reimbursement is good policy, we find many corpora-
tions making no provisions whatever; many do adopt agreements
but they are a hodge-podge, having no trace of standardization and
all are subject to the defects and uncertainties considered above.
It is submitted that this whole problem can perhaps best be solved
by the legislature. But here again the path must be carefully trod
because there have been enactments in this area in other states
which have failed to measure up to expectations in the effectua-
tion of the desired policy. We shall now consider, along with de-
sired provisions, some of the missteps that should be avoided in
solving the problem by statute.3 4
RE=RsUm By STATUTE
Some of our states have become conscious of the uncertainty
and doubts that emanate from reliance on corporate authority, by-
law or charter provision for reimbursement. Accordingly, in order
to dispel this uncertainty and establish a standard policy, they have
enacted statutes that afford remedies in this situation. California,35
Kentucky,36 New York,37 and Wisconsin38 are included in those
states which have taken this salutary step. But the enactments vary
as to execution of the policy and in some cases leave much to be
desired.
In the first place the statute should afford an exclusive remedy.
It should not be merely an enabling act authorizing corporate agree-
ments. It should make ineffective any by-law, charter provisions
or case law on the subject. It should also apply to directors and of-
ficers of the corporation and at the same time to foreign as well as
domestic corporations. Whether or not a man is an officer or di-
rector should make no difference in the light of the over-all policy
needed and desired. Likewise, the soundness of the policy can
best be promoted by making it applicable to all corporations.
Furthermore, this constructive policy would be given more vitality
if it were not restricted to shareholders' derivative suits. Even
33 Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
34For a further discussion of the corporate agreement method of reim-
bursement see Bates & Zuckert, Directors' Indemnity; Corporate Policy or
Public Policy?, 20 HAmv. Bus. RPv. 244 1942).
3 5 CAL. STAT., c. 934 (1943); CAL. CIV. CODE § 375.
36 Ky. AcTS, c. 40, § 1 (1942); KY. REv. STATS. §§ 271 and 245 (1942).
37N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAw, See. 27a, L. 1941, c. 209.
38 Wis. STAT., c. 182, § 182.01 (9a) (1949).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
though this discussion has been made with a derivative suit setting,
it should be recognized that this type proceeding is not the only
one confronting the director. The statutory remedy should apply
not only to shareholders' derivative suits, but also to actions by
the corporation, by a receivor or trustee of a corporation, by credi-
tors, by any governmental body or by any person or corporation.
This would place no limitation upon the class of complainants or
the kind of proceedings to which indemnity applies. There seems
to be no reason why indemnity should be confined to one type of
proceeding.3 9
As was stated earlier, of the few courts which do permit reim-
bursement, the greater number require that a benefit be bestowed
upon the corporation before reimbursement will be allowed the
successful director. Any statute on this subject should anticipate
this interpretation and make the language unambiguous by per-
mitting indemnity notwithstanding any lack of benefit upon the
corporation.
Then too, some extant enactments on the subject have been
brought to test because they were made applicable to pending
litigation. Generally, however, it has been held that such retro-
spective or retroactive legislation is not invalid.40 Even though
these provisions might be made severable if invalid, it might be
wiser to make the act entirely prospective and thus avoid any dif-
ficulties attending retroactive legislation.
This type statute also has been questioned as to its constitution-
ality under the equal protection clause of the Fdurteenth Amend-
ment. Several legal writers have noted the possibility that a statute
does discriminate against corporations when it directs that a cor-
poration, which unsuccessfully sues its fiduciaries, must pay, not
only court "costs," but also actual expenses, whereas an individual
who unsuccessfully institutes a suit against his agent is penalized
only the usual statutory costs (which bear no reference to actual
expenses) .41 Possibly, corporations can be reasonably classed for
this purpose.
It should also be considered that a fair act should have re-
ciprocity in favor of the corporation. When the director or officer
is adjudged guilty of breach of trust he should be made to reim-
39 Ballantine, Californi's 1943 Statute as to Directors' Litigation Expenses:
An Exclusive Remedy for Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Employees,
31 CALi L. Ruv. 515, 517 (1943).
40 Application of Bailey, 178 Misc. 1045, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 275, 279, 281 (1942);
Ann., Validity of Retrospective Legislation Awarding Attorneys' Fees (1934)
90 A. L. M. 530, 537.
41 Hornstein, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits, 43 CoL. L. Rev.
301, 309 (1943).
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burse the corporation for its cost in obtaining redress. This cost
not infrequently amounts to almost as much as the recovery.
The heart of a statute on this subject is the reimbursement it-
self. Who should determine the directors' expenses and attorneys'
fees? How much should they be, and for what? What should be
the procedure for awarding compensation to counsel for defendant
directors? The statutes have varied on this provision and in some
cases the results have been unsatisfactory. No statute should pro-
vide that a director or officer will be mandatorily reimbursed, un-
less adjudged liable for "actual negligence or misconduct" in the
performance of his duties. This is too broad. It permits the di-
rector to obtain indemnity when he escapes liability on grounds
other than freedom from negligence or misconduct, such as pro-
cedural defects, Statutes of Limitations, dismissal or delay in suit.
The defendant director should be found innocent on the merits be-
fore he should be entitled to any indemnity as a matter of right.
Also connected with the problem of reimbursement is the re-
lated problem of who should decide when it should be given, and
how much. Any statute that leaves these questions to the discre-
tion of the board of directors or to the shareholders has not at-
tained the maximum degree of fairness that is possible. Provisions
inserted to guarantee impartial voting by directors or stockhold-
ers are utterly impractical and cannot be enforced.42 Then too,
quite often, the directors and stockholders do not possess the es-
sential factors of first-hand knowledge of services actually render-
ed in order to determine the amount that should be awarded coun-
sel for a director.
It is submitted that the proper party to resolve the questions
relevant to indemnity is the court that tries the suit. The judge is
in a position fairly to determine the merits of the cause and the
value of the attorneys' services rendered therein. More often than
not, the association of the members of a board of directors with a
fellow director is too intimate to permit an unbiased consideration
of his claim for reimbursement, even where the board is possessed
of the facts necessary to a just decision.43 The judge should have
the discretion to withhold indemnity should he determine that the
conduct of the party is such as not to fairly and equitably merit
such indemnity. In this manner, a director might still receive in-
demnity should a suit be dismissed before it has gone to trial on
the merits. This method of using the court to determine the value
of legal services in a case before it has been utilized in other pro-
ceedings. It has been used in suits for violations of the Copy-
42 Ballantine, supra note 39, at 529.
43 Comment, Right to Attorneys' Fees in Shareholders' Derivative Suits,
30 CrAr. L. REv. 667, 675 (1942).
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right Law 4 or the Securities Act of 1933,45 and under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.4 6
Having placed the duty of awarding compensation upon the
court, there remains the matter of procedure. It would seem to
save time and cost if application to the court for compensation were
made in the suit against the director, preferably before judgment
for the director. The application should be filed by the attorney de-
fending the director. His compensation could then be made a part
of the judgment. The judge is generally in a position to have first
hand knowledge of the services that have been rendered in the pro-
ceeding before him. Coupled with this application for compensa-
tion there should be notice served upon the corporation or its rep-
resentative and upon the plaintiff and other parties in the action
or proceeding. Determining the amount of compensation is often
difficult since the court does not have any amount of recovery to
rely on when the director is successful. Applications for reimburse-
ment would require close supervision by the court since counsel for
the corporation may not be too disposed to keep down reimburse-
ment to an attorney for a director who passes upon the continuance
of the employment of the corporation counsel.
Another major concern in drafting the statute herein contem-
plated relates to the possibility that the director may be successful
only in part, or perhaps voluntarily settles the case. Not infrequent-
ly, due to forms of pleading, the director is able to be partially suc-
cessful in his defense. It would seem that the ideal statute would
authorize indemnity for partial success but leave it entirely to the
discretion of the judge sitting at the trial. Compensation should al-
ways be reasonable and if, upon the equities, the judge finds that
the partially successful director should be compensated, he should
be free to do so.
The question becomes more involved with respect to a volun-
tary settlement by the director. It is possible to rely entirely up-
on the discretion of the judge and permit indemnity if the settle-
ment is made before a court. However, it seems rather inconsistent
to allow a party to voluntarily settle a claim against himself and
then, in turn, seek reimbursement from the party to whom he paid
the settlement.
These provisions here touched upon are by no means exhaus-
tive. They are intended to point up that even though the statute
is the proper method for dealing with this problem, it too may pre-
cipitate the evils, doubts, and uncertainties, that we found frequent-
ly accompany indemnity methods discussed earlier. It is obvious
44 35 STAT. 1084 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 40 (1941).
4S 48 STAT. 907 (1934), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77 k (e) (1941).
46 52 STAT. 900-901 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §§ 641-643, 647, 650 (1941).
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that the maximum effectuation of the desired policy with a rea-
sonable degree of fairness will only be obtained after careful study
of the deficiencies of the methods of attempted correction. The
knowledge thus obtained must be skillfully transmuted into a stat-
ute approaching the pinnacle of drafting finesse if that policy is to
materialize as an enactment beneficial to society.
SUMuRY
The advent of the corporation on the economic horizon to, in
many cases, positions of great power has revolutionized our eco-
nomic structure to such an extent that each individual is intimately
affected by their decisions, policies and activities. An increase in
the power of the corporation means an increase in the responsibili-
ties of the directors and officers who direct and manage them. We
must keep pace with these advances, and, as long as they do affect
our lives we should not hesitate to make certain that they are in
the hands of our most capable men, men who are conscious of their
trust and who will not jeopardize the welfare of society as a whole
for the sake of the selfish interests of a few. One step or aid to the
procurement of these high caliber men is the creation of safeguards
around the periphery of directorship or management. Remove those
barriers that prompt many able men to shy away. Today, the in-
creasing possibility of being forced to defend a derivative action
with its attendant cost is a thorn that penetrates to the very core.
A guarantee of reimbursement will aid in dispelling these fears
and attract the qualities of leadership the offices demand.
We have seen that the guarantee of reimbursement is too un-
certain and haphazard if left to the caprice of the individual cor-
porations. Likewise, the courts have seemingly failed to recognize
the need as it exists today. Corporation agreements are a step in
the right direction but they lack standardization and fail to solve
the problem in many cases.
In the final analysis, the problem should be left to the wisdom
of the legislatures if uniformity is to be obtained. They are in the
best position to promote the best interests of society. California's
legislative body has accepted the challenge and come forth with
what would appear to be one of the finest acts on this subject.47
Corporate agreements are utilized in Ohio. One Ohio case 48
indicates the court view on the matter. Ohio has no statute on di-
rectors' reimbursement. It is suggested that the Ohio General As-
sembly would be doing the populace of the state and nation a serv-
ice were it to consider and act upon the question of reimbursing
directors and officers for successful defense of a derivative suit.
Cornelius W. Dillon
47 Note 35, supra.
4 8 Note 33, supra.
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